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In the Supreme Court

~~Q

of the State of Utah
SLIM OLSON, INC., a corporation,
1

-;

Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.No. 7801
KEITH WINEGAR, doing business
as INTERMOUNTAIN OIL DISTRIBUTORS,
Defenda;nt and Appella;nt.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF F:ACTS
On June 6, 1951, plaintiff filed suit to recover $3,778.43 with legal interest, also attorney fees, on an account for goods sold and services rendered to defendant
between January 1 and May 18, 1951. On March 24, 1951,
prior to the filing of this action, defendant brought action
against plaintiff for damages for destruction of a Diesel
3
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engine as a result of negligent installation of a sump
bag, (No. 4293 in the same court, which case is now before this I-Ionorable Court on appeal, No. 7780). In said
other m1se which is now No. 7780 in this Court, plaintiff
herein as defendant in that action, filed an answer on
April 9, 1951, but no counterclaim.
In the answer filed by defendant in the above entitled cause, the defendant admitted all except $17.12 of
the account asserted by plaintiff as justly due and owing.
Defendant denied liability for counsel fees. As a further
defense, defendant alleged that civil case No. 4293 was an
action arising out of the services performed for this defendant by plaintiff; and that plaintiff herein was barred
from asserting any claim as to matters in controversy
in said other case by virtue of the provisions of Rule 13,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by failure to assert such
claims by way of counterclaim.
Exhibit "A" offered in evidence by plaintiff in this
case, consists of a number of sales slips and delivery
tickets, which includes one dated January 24, 1951, for
the following items:
Lubrication ------------------------------------------------------$
Gear grease 4 pints --------------------------------------Lubefiner ---------------------------------------------------------Sump bag -------------------------------------------------------Sump gasket ---------------------------------------------------Labor on filters .............................. -............................................................
Tax --------------------------------------------------------------------

3.00 ·
1.00
5.00
.90
.50
.50

.16

Total ----------------------------- ... -...........................
·
--------------$11.06
4
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Thus, one of the items of the alleged account in this
action, was a claim dated January 24, 1951, for servicing
of a Diesel engine and the installation of a smnp bag.
Said iten1 of account is definitely related to the cause of
action asserted by defendant in the negligence action in
which defendant herein sued for destruction of his Diesel
engine. Said negligence action is now on appeal in this
Court as case No. 7780.
The trial court overruled in toto the objection of this
defendant, that this action was barred as to matters
which should have been asserted by way of counterclaim
in the negligence action. The court affirmatively held
that action was not barred, and in effect gave judgment
against defendant for the service and installation performed January 24, 1951, which was the subject of controversy in the other action. Judgment was.allowed without proof of correct service or satisfactory installation.
The matters in controversy on this appeal are principally questions of law.

POINTS ON WHICH DEFENDANT RELIES FOR
REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT
1.

The trial court erred in awarding counsel fees.

2. The court erred in allowing recovery with respect to items in the account which should have been asserted as a counterclaim in another action.
5
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ARGUMENT
Point No.1:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING COUNSEL
FEES.

The plaintiff sued on an open account for goods sold
and for services rendered. The award of counsel fees
was based on a statement printed on the lower power of
the sales slips (Exhibit "A") :
"Received from SLIM OLSON, INC., the
above described merchandise. The undersigned
agrees to pay all costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, if this account is referred to an attorney for collection."
An examination of the sales slips or delivery tickets
(Exhibit "A"), discloses that a number of them were
signed by persons other than defendant. The signatures
were placed above the foregoing statement. The defendant denied by answer that any of these people were authorized to agree to pay counsel fees. There was no evidence of any authorization.
As far as the individual tickets were concerned, even
if the signatures had been made below the statement,
there could not be implied any promise to pay except
by the individual who signed. The statement is that "the
undersigned agrees to pay." They were not signed in the
name of defendant, except in several instances, and as far
as the record is concerned, those particular tickets might
well have been covered by the advances or ·payments
made by defendant.
6
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If such a clause inserted at the bott01n of a sales
ticket or delivery slip can be construed as a covenant
by the principal to pay counsel fees, then every truck
driver whose authority and employment is limited to receiving and delivering goods, can exercise the same authority as an executive vice-president or general manager
of the c01npany making the purchase, without the consent
of the c01npany. The authority to pick up goods or freight
which is given to a truck driver, should not be construed
to authorize the employee to execute an agreement for
payment of counsel fees, which would be binding upon
the principal although not done in the name of the principal
None of the tickets are signed below the questioned
statement as "Keith Winegar," or "Intermountain Oil
Distributors, By X------------------------·" If the defendant can
be held liable for counsel fees, then even if the goods were
picked up by messenger or other independent contractor,
the purchaser of the goods could be held liable for attorney fees.
We have found no authority which would support
the judginent for counsel fees in a case of this kind, independent of statute. We contend that the award of
counsel fees was entirely in error.
Point No.2:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING RECOVERY
WITH RESPECT TO ITEMS IN THE ACCOUNT WHICH
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ASSERTED AS A COUNTERCLAIM
IN ANOTHER ACTION.

,7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

By Finding of Fact No.6 the trial court found that:
"this account and the cause of action did not. arise
out of the transaction alleged in ~hat cer:taln action entitled 'I{eith Winegar, do1ng b"?s1ness as
Intermountain Oil Distributors v. Shm Olson,
Inc., a corporation, Defendant,'. being Civil N?.
4293 but the court finds that sa1d cause and this
caus~ were consolidated for trial, * * * And the
court finds that the plaintiff is not barred under
the provisions of Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure or at all from proceeding in this
cause."
There can be no dispute about the fact that included
in this action was a claim for $11.06 for lubrication, installation of sump bag, etc., on January 24, 1951. Said
Civil Case No. 4293 (now pending in this Court as No.
7780) was brought by defendant herein against the plaintiff herein on March 24, 1951, to recover damages for the
negligent installation of a sump bag as a result of which
installation the Diesel engine was starved of oil and the
engine was completely destroyed. On April 9, 1951, plaintiff herein as the defendant in said action, filed an answer to the complaint. It denied liability, but did not file
any counterclaim fo:r: recovery of the costs of installation
or the materials and oils and greases involved in connection therewith. Our contention is that with respect
to all matters which could be classified as "compulsory
counterclaims," action was barred here by failure to set
up such items by way of counterclaim.
Rule 13 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
reads as follows:
8
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a:

.. (a)
COnlPULSORY COUNTERCLAil\L
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any clairu
which at the ti1ne of serving the pleading the
pleader has against any opposing party, if it
arises out of the transaction o1· occurrence that is
the s1tbject matter of the opposing party's claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction, except that such a claim need
not be stated if at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another
pending action." (Italics added.)

...-.

Federal Rule 13(a) is identical with our Utah Rule
13(a). It is to be noted that the rule states:
"A pleading shall state as a counterclaim
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party,
if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim." (Italics added.)
In support of defendant's contention in this matter
it is necessary to interpret the meaning of the phrase
"transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim."
As stated in Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 3, P.

30:

.-•::·
---.

"An all-embracing definition cannot be given,
nor is one desirable. The same flexibility and
same empirical treatment is necessary in connection with 'transaction or occurrence' that has been
advocated and discussed in connection with 'cause
of action.' "
Moore then quotes from the case of Moore v. New

9
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York Cotton Exchange (1926), 270 U. S. 593; 46 S. Ct
367; 70 L. Ed. 750, as follows:
"'Transaction' is a word of flexible meaning.
It may comprehend a series of man?J occu:rences,
depending not so much upon t.he tm_medwten_ess
of their connection as upon thetr logtca_l relf!rtwnship. The refusal to furnish the quotations Is one
of the links in the chain which constitutes the
transaction upon which appellant here basis its
cause of action. It is an important part of the
transaction constituting the subject-matter of the
counterclaim. It is the one circumstance without
which neither party would have found it necessary to seek relief. Essential facts alleged by appellant enter into and constitute in part the cause
of action set forth in the counterclaim. That they
are not precisely indentical, or that the counterclaim embraces additional allegations; as, for example, that appellant is unlawfully getting the
quotations, does not matter. To hold otherwise
would be to rob this branch of the rule (the compulsory counterclaim provisions of Equity Rule
30) of all serviceable meaning, since the facts
relied upon by the plaintiff rarely, if ever, are, in
all particulars, the same as those constituting the
defendant's counterclaim."
The case of Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. MusantePhillips, Inc., (1941) 42 Fed. Sup. 340, also supports
the contention of appellant. In this case the plaintiffs
sue to recover freight and other charges upon a carload
of lettuce from Oxnard, California, by various diversions
to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where the consignee rejected. The defendant filed a counterclaim alleging that
the carload of lettuce was diverted so negligently by vari10
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ous connecting carriers that the lettuce arrived in a
da.Inaged condition. The Court held that Rule 13(a) was
mandatory, and if the defendant had not pleaded its
counterclaiin it would have been precluded by raising
the same matter in an independent action.

Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, et al.
(1947) 159 Fed. Sup. (2d) 349. This was an action
against the United States for earned freight. Counterclaims for damage, demurrage and expenses alleged to
unworthiness of the vessel were held to be compulsory
counterclaims which must be pleaded under Rule 13(a).

.:.

In Advance Thresher Co. v. Klein 133, N. W. 51, action was brought on a series of notes given for the purchase price of a threshing rig. The notes were given to
secure the purchase price which was set ou~ in a contract
of sale. The defendant counterclaimed for medical expenses and loss of services occasioned defendant by injuries to his minor son while assisting the plaintiff's
agent in repairing the rig, which repair was being made
pursuant to the contract between plaintiff and defendant. The Court, in interpreting the meaning of the ·
word "transaction," quotes the case of Story v. Story,
100 Cal. 30, 34 Pac. 671, as follows :
"In the case of Story v. Story & Isham Commercial Co., 100 Cal. 30, 34 Pac. 671, the court
held that the 'transaction' comprehended within
the meaning of this section of the Code is not
limited to the facts set forth in the complaint, but
includes the entire series of a.cts and mutual conduct of the parties in the business or proceeding
11
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between them which formed the bas~s of the. agreement, and if plaintiff omits or fatls t~ set forth
in his complaint the entire transactwn out of
which the claim arose defendant may supplement
this omission by setting forth in his ans~er the
omitted facts, so that the entir~ t:ansactwn: may
be before the court. The plainttff t~ no~ at hberty
to select an isolated act or fact, whwh ts only one
of a series of acts or steps in the entire transaction, and insist on a judgment on that fact alone,
if the fact is so co1vnected with others that it forms
only a portion of the transaction." See also 34
Cyc. 686 and 687.

The Court then goes on and discusses the threshing
rig case:
"In the case at bar, the notes set out in the
complaint constitute but a component part or portion of the entire transaction of the sale of the
threshing machinery by plaintiff to defendant.
The contract of sale with all its mutual agreements and provisions, the acts of all the parties
and their agents performed under and by virtue
thereof in carrying out and performing the mutual provisions thereof, the repair of the engine,
the assistance to be furnished in such repair on
the part of defendant, are all parts of one and the
same transaction, just as much as the giving or
the payment or nonpayment of the notes sued
upon. The question then arises, Was the alleged
negligent injury to the defendant's son so connected with the transaction or subject-matter of
the action as to constitute a proper counterclaim~"
The court held that it was.
These cases make a very realistic and broad interpretation of the word "transaction." The Moore case
12
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cited above is authority under Federal Rule 13(a), since
Rule 13(a) is broader in scope than Equity Rule 30 under
which the Moore case was decided. Equity Rule 30 required a counterclaim "arising out of the transaction
which is the subject-matter of the suit." Rule 13(a) requires a counterclaim arisii_1g "out of ·the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject-n1atter of the suit."
In 3 Moore's Federal Practice, p. 33, appears the
statement:
"Courts should give the phrase 'transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter' of the suit
a broad realistic interpretation in the interest of
avoiding multiplicity of ·suits. Subject to the exceptions, any claim that is logically related to
another claim that is being sued on is properly
the basis for a compulsory counterclaim; only
claims that are unrelated to or are related, but
within the exceptions, need not be pleaded. * * *"
The note to Rule 13(a) states that "Sees 104-9-1 (2)
and 104-9-3, are covered by this rule. Section 104-9-3,
U. C. A. 1943, provided:
"If the defendant omits to set up a counterclaim in the cases mentioned in the first subdivision of the next preceding section, neither he nor
his assignee can afterwards maintain an action
against the plaintiff therefor."
The rules do not expressly state the language of the
foregoing former statutory provision, but by implication
they bar action on matters which would be compulsory
counterclaims, by subdivision (e) of Rule 13 :
13
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"When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvert_ence, or excus . .
able neglect or when justice requnes, he may by
leave of co~rt set up the counterclaim by amendment."
.There is a fundamental reason why a defendant
should be compelled to assert as a counterclaim any matters which arise out of the transaction which is the subject-matter of the claim of plaintiff. The instant case
help to illustrate the necessity for such a rule to prevent
a miscarriage of justice. If a defendant who is sued for
negligently performing a service in such a manner that
it resulted in damage to plaintiff, denies that he rendered such service in his attempt to defeat the negligence
action, he should not be permitted in a subsequent action
to recover for the very service which he denied that he
ever rendered.
In the instant case, plaintiff who was the defendant
In the negligence action, by answer filed April 9, 1951,
admitted that the truck was serviced on January 24,1951,
but denied that the corporation did or was in any manner
responsible for the things of which Keith Winegar complained. No counterclaim was set up for recovery of the
amount claimed for service to the truck which was the
basis of the negligence claim of Keith Winegar. Nor was
any counterclaim set up for any services rendered to the
plaintiff in that action (defendant in the instant case).
However, on June 6, 1951, Slim Olson, Inc., filed an independent action to recover on open account, which included the transaction of January 24, 1951, with respect
to the very Diesel engine in controversy.
14
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If plaintiff had counterclaimed in the negligence
action for the clain1 of January 24, 1951, for service and
installation on the Diesel engine, as we contend plaintiff
was required to do under the cmnpulsory counterclaim
rule, plaintiff would have been compelled to prove that
it perforn1ed the service in a good workmanlike manner.
By filing an independent action and including therein
the claim which related to the controversy with respect
to January 24, 1951, along with other claims, plaintiff
sought to be compensated in this action for service on
the Diesel engine on the theory that it was done properly.
There was no evidence that the service and installation
was properly done.
Even if the question of attorney fees were not involved in this action, defendant here would have been
compelled to appeal in this case, by reason of the inclusion in this case, the controversial claim which is the
subject of the negligence action; for even if defendant
here as the plaintiff in the negligence action prevails
in this Court, upon the re-trial of said cause, the plaintiff
here as defendant in that action would doubtless attempt
to plead the judgment in this case as a bar to recovery.
Plaintiff would doubtless claim that recovery was had in
this case for installation, and that by implication, judgment in this case covering the service and installati~n
was for proper installation and negatived negligent installation.
Defendant has been compelled to take two appeals,
due in part to the failure of the trial court to exclude
from this case, matters which were part of the "tran-

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

saction or occurrence" which constituted the subject
matter of the negligence action. Plaintiff should not be
permitted to say that although covered by the compulsory counterclaim rule, it should be excepted therefrom because it chose to combine its claiin which should
have been asserted as a counterclaim, with other claims
which were independent of the controversy over the
Diesel engine. The evil of allowing any such an exception is that it allows a party to have more than "his
day in court," and subjects the injured party to two
appeals involving the identical controversy.
The streamlining of our Rules of Civil Procedure
will operate to short-circuit justice, if the term "Compulsory Counterclaim" can be construed to mean "Optional Counterclaim." If such construction of Rule 13
were permitted, it would permit a defendant to deny liability in an action for services negligently performed,
and then allow recovery in a subsequent action for the
very service with respect to which he denied liability,
and perhaps previously denied that he ever rendered.
When the evidence disclosed that the account for
January 24, 1951, was included in this action, the court
should have treated that matter as barred by failure
to set up such claim as a counterclaim in the negligence
case. Counsel for defendant here argued at the trial
that items in the account were barred in addition to the
ones of January 24, 1951. Even if defendant were wrong
in claiming additional items or even all of the items
were barred, that error could not obviate the prejudicial
error of the trial court in holding that none of the items
16
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~

were barred. The ihnns relating to the servicing of the
- Diesel engine on January :2-1, 1951, were definitely claiins
which arose "out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject Inatter of the opposing party's claim" in
the negligence action.

..
_

-~4

--

The court declared that both cases were consolidated
for trial. The consolidation was without notice; but disregarding such fact, consolidation of two cases for trial
did not operate to make the complaint in the instant
case or any portion thereof, a counterclaim in the negligence action. Furthermore, the two cases were not
merged, but remained separate and independent cases.
With respect to claims which are barred by reason of
failure to assert them as compulsory counterclaims,
there could be nothing to consolidate for purposes of
trial.

CONCLUSION

.:

->~

The trial court committed reversible error by awarding counsel fees in an action on open account, partieularly in view of the lack of authority of the truck drivers
to make any agree1nents for defendant to pay counsel
fees.

The trial court also committed prejudicial error in
_.. - holding that this action is not barred under Rule 13.
Such ruling was reversible error with respect to the
-.- items pertaining to the servicing of the Diesel engine on
January 24, 1951. There was no proof that plaintiff had
17
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perforrned that service and installation in a cmnpetent
and prudent manner. Regardless of how s1nall the
amount involved might be, inclusion in the judgment of
said amount is prejudicial, particularly if plaintiff as
defendant in the negligence action can plead recovery in
this action as a bar to the claim of negligence in the
event of re-trial in the negligence case.
Respectfully submitted,

McKAY, BURTON, :McMILLAN
& RICHARDS,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant.
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